Scotland generates more renewable electricity than it can use. England needs more clean power. Both countries need more resilient energy grids. The solution is simple enough: run a cable between them.

England, Scotland, and Wales have already planned and executed several of these links, but the Eastern Green Link 1 (EGL1) is the most ambitious. The £2.5 billion project will transport 2GW of Scottish wind power through 196 kilometres of cable — mostly underwater — from Torness in Scotland’s East Lothian to Hawthorn Pit in County Durham.

It's part of Britain's "Great Grid Upgrade," a multibillion-pound effort to modernise the electricity network for an ongoing clean energy transition. But, naturally, building a subsea power highway across the North Sea comes with a raft of engineering challenges.

Why build an electricity superhighway?

Scotland's renewable energy output is impressive but geographically awkward. The country generated 113% of its electricity consumption from renewables in 2022, and had to ask wind farms to curtail production due to a lack of transmission capacity to move the power south.

According to the National Energy System Operator, EGL1 will deliver annual savings of over £870 million by reducing compensation payments to wind generators.

The project forms part of the government's Clean Power 2030 ambition. As Energy Minister Michael Shanks explains, EGL1 is “part of our once-in-a-generation upgrade to Britain's energy infrastructure, using some of the most advanced subsea technology in the world."

EGL1 is the first of four planned England-Scotland HVDC interconnectors. The £4.3 billion EGL2 between Peterhead and Drax will follow, using 436km of undersea cable to become the UK's longest HVDC connection.

Converting and transmitting power

The first necessary piece of infrastructure handles electricity conversion. Scotland's existing network runs on high-voltage alternating current (HVAC), but long-distance transmission requires high-voltage direct current (HVDC) for efficiency.

Two converter stations will handle this transformation. 7-hectare sites at Torness and Hawthorn Pit will house conversion stations to convert electricity between AC and DC using ±525 kV HVDC technology.

The subsea cable consists of two electrical cables and a fibre optic cable. Nearly 400km of power cable is required for the 196km route — the additional length accounts for the cable's installation pattern on the seabed and redundancy requirements.

Navigating North Sea geology

The 176km subsea section presents complex engineering challenges, and the North Sea's variable geology demands different installation approaches across the route.

Pre-installation surveys identified over 1,300 boulders near the Scottish landfall, requiring boulder clearance trials before cable laying can begin.

For the geology nerds, the cable route goes through Holocene-era silty sand and sandy clay substrates. On top of this, the seabed is dynamic, and difficult to bury cables in — large sandwaves, and megaripples up to 2.5 metres high are formed by strong North Sea currents.

As a result, burial methods will be tailored to the relevant seabed conditions:

• In sand-dominated areas, water-jetting trenchers will fluidise sediments with high-pressure water, before burying cables about a metre deep;

• In hard or rocky areas where burial isn't feasible, mechanical trenchers or concrete mattresses will be employed.

Horizontal directional drilling

The project uses horizontal directional drilling (HDD) at both landfalls to install ducts under intertidal zones and seabeds close to shore. It’s a trenchless method that both minimises the environmental impact on sensitive coastal habitats and provides a secure cable route.

With this technique, conduits are drilled in a shallow arc along a prescribed path, which allows cables to be pulled through without disturbing the surface. For EGL1, this will help avoid direct excavation in ecologically sensitive areas while ensuring a secure connection.

Then, the 20km of onshore cabling — 10km in each country — will be buried 0.6-1.5 metres deep in underground ducts. Once installation is complete, the Scottish and English joint venture has promised to restore the land above to its previous coastal grassland.

Who's building what

EGL1 is a joint venture between SP Energy Networks (transmission operator for Central and South Scotland, North England, and North Wales) and National Grid Electricity Transmission (England and Wales).

Major contracts worth around £1.8 billion have been awarded:

Prysmian Group secured a £750 million contract to supply nearly 400km of power cable.

A consortium of GE Vernova and MYTILINEOS received a £1 billion contract to supply and construct the two HVDC converter stations.

Murphy handles initial onshore construction work, with offshore operations planned for summer 2025.

Britain's energy regulator, Ofgem (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets), granted the project approval and fast-tracked funding through its new Accelerated Strategic Transmission Investment framework.

Costs and timeline

The project's budget has grown from an initial request of £1.65 billion for direct construction to £2.5 billion. Ofgem cited demand and commodity inflation driving cost increases across all electricity transmission projects.

The budget includes £7.9 million for a social value and community benefit fund to ensure hosting communities benefit from the infrastructure, plus another £7.9 million for a carbon innovation fund supporting UK net zero targets.

Construction began in March 2025 with onshore works. Offshore cable laying is scheduled for summer 2025, with full operation targeted for 2029 — two years later than initially promised during consultation.

Part of a bigger picture

EGL1 follows in the wake of the Western Link, which connects Hunterston in Scotland to Connah's Quay in Wales. That 240-mile cable has been operational since 2017, transmitting more than 23,000 GWh of green energy in its first five years.

The broader Green Link programme includes plans for connections between Peterhead and Lincolnshire, then between Kinghorn in Fife and Norfolk. Combined with planned upgrades of powerlines across Scotland, these projects aim to deliver the UK government's target of 50GW of offshore wind power by 2030.

SSEN Transmission suggests the wider programme could see investment exceed £24 billion this decade, directly addressing the UK's energy security challenges and reducing reliance on international gas markets.

For now, EGL1 tests whether Britain can successfully build the transmission infrastructure needed for its clean energy ambitions. The technical challenges are significant but manageable. Whether the project stays on schedule and budget will indicate how smoothly the broader grid upgrade programme might proceed.

From Dubai’s 2040 Urban Master Plan to Tanzania’s Bagamoyo Port and Saudi Arabia’s trillion-dollar megacity ‘The Line’, North Africa and the Middle East are home to hugely ambitious infrastructure proposals.

These monuments inject jobs, foreign investment, and infrastructure into local economies, but they also contribute to the type of stories these countries want to tell about themselves: their national identity, and their international reputation.

Egypt’s New Administrative Capital (NAC) is a prime example. Egypt has built satellite cities to Cairo before, mostly between the 70s to 90s. But the NAC is unique in its scope and grandeur.

Announced in March 2015, the NAC is already sprawling across an area about the same size as Singapore’s main island. From the largest cathedral in the Middle East to a proposed kilometre-high obelisk, the NAC is following through on some sky-high claims.

Why build a new capital?

Cairo is one of the biggest cities in the world. Like other global capitals, it has struggled for decades with overpopulation, congestion, limited housing, and social unrest.

In 2016, Egypt launched a national agenda called ‘Vision 2030’ as the cornerstone of its development efforts. A central part of Vision 2030 is the NAC: a new capital featuring the majority of Egypt’s legislative, governance, and military administration, 45 kilometres away from Cairo.

But it’s about more than just sending the bureaucrats down the road. The NAC proposal includes 25 residential neighbourhoods, designed with access to green spaces and other quality of life measures in mind. And huge proposed structures like the Oblisco Capitale building will reportedly be home to extensive shopping, residential, and entertainment spaces. Although the exact number has shifted across the NAC’s development, it eventually hopes to be home to about 5 million of Cairo’s current residents.

A modern desert city

Because the site is in a previously undeveloped desert, building a metropolis from scratch has presented some particular logistical challenges. All basic infrastructure — power, water, telecommunications, and transport — had to be established before any buildings could rise.

And the engineering scale is vast: 10,000 kilometers of roads were planned for Phase 1 alone, plus utility networks spanning the entire development area.

Cairo itself is mostly built on rich alluvial soils proximate to the Nile, but its new satellite cities extend into deserts and plateaus. There, the low cohesion and high permeability of the sandy soil means it has a high risk of differential settlement that requires soil improvement for cultivation, and deep foundations for construction.

Construction also means dealing with extreme temperature variations, sand infiltration, and soil subsidence under heavy loads.

What's actually been built

Construction on the NAC has currently been completed across 40,000 feddans (168km²) of desert. Public servants are already working in the new government district, home to Egypt's cabinet, parliament, and various ministries. The Central Business District also has multiple completed office towers, including the 385.8-meter Iconic Tower — now Africa's tallest building.

Residential areas are taking shape too. Better Home Group recently completed its Midtown Solo project, with standalone villas targeting high-end buyers. 95% of infrastructure works for Phase 1 are reportedly complete, with final utility connections pending developer compliance.

This is less than a quarter of the total planned development. Phases 2-4 will expand across another 770 square kilometres, although their start has been delayed until 2026 while the government focuses on completing current work.

Coordination across the capital

The Administrative Capital for Urban Development (ACUD) oversees the entire project. The Ministry of Housing holds 49% of ACUD’s ownership, while the military holds 51%. Among other things, the military’s involvement provides access to cheap labor through conscripts and control over key supply chains like steel and cement.

While ACUD takes the primary oversight role, two key firms have been involved in day-to-day management and design.

US architecture firm SOM developed the NAC’s initial master plan. International consultancy Dar al-Handasah Shair & Partners has now taken over detailed planning.

Dar was involved with the entire CBD design process, the Capital Park Development Corridor master plan, and supervision of the Governmental District construction. For Phases 2-4, Dar will handle everything from roads and utility networks to "future-fitness strategies" that incorporate AI integration.

Smart city surveillance

As with many other new, from-scratch cities, the NAC wants to integrate smart features. So far, this involves extensive and comprehensive civilian monitoring.

A surveillance system delivered by Honeywell promises to “monitor crowds and traffic congestion, detect incidents of theft, observe suspicious people or objects, and trigger automated alarms in emergency situations.” Residents will use smart cards and apps for everything from unlocking doors to making payments, and public WiFi will be beamed from lamp posts.

Technology contracts have already delivered a bill of USD 640 million. Later phases involving Huawei, Orange, and Mastercard could push the investment to $900 million.

This intensified surveillance highlights another reason for moving state administration out of the densely populated capital: it’s harder to mobilise a mass protest when the government is 45 kilometres down the road. Even if protestors got to the NAC, walking across its vast expanse would take hours.

The money question

The NAC’s $58 billion price tag raises obvious questions about priorities. Most Egyptians can't afford to live in the capital being built in their name: two-bedroom apartments in the city cost around $50,000 in a country where GDP per capita sits below $3,000 annually. On the other hand, the vast array of construction needs creates jobs across Egypt's struggling industries.

In the centre of these conversations — and the centre of the NAC — is the proposed Oblisco Capitale. A kilometre high and heavy with symbols of Egyptian national identity, it aims to usurp the Burj Khalifa as the tallest building in the world.

Announcements about the Oblisco date back to 2018, situating it within Vision 2030 principles of ‘human-centred development’ and ‘well-developed infrastructure’. Although it’s generated significant media buzz, it hasn't progressed beyond architectural renderings from Egyptian firm IDIA. Ground hasn't been broken, tenders haven't been issued, and no construction timeline has been released.

Turning architectural ambition into concrete reality obviously requires more than dramatic renderings. But, as the Iconic Tower (and the whole NAC) proves, Egypt is more than capable of delivering grand infrastructure projects when resources align with its political priorities.

On the pod

This week, the team tackles the global rise of megaprojects, the revolution in AI browsers, and the UK infrastructure wave. Enjoy!

Germany is building its largest offshore wind farm using turbines that have never been deployed commercially before.

He dreiht is Low German for it spins, and its 64 Vestas V236-15MW turbines will certainly do that. Their swept area is equivalent to six football fields and, according to Vestas, a single turn of one turbine could power four households for a day.

Located off the northern coast of Germany, the €2.4 billion project requires some serious heavy lifting. It's also a test of whether offshore wind can work without state subsidies — a claim that operator EnBW is keen to prove.

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It spins!

Located 110 kilometres west of the German archipelago of Helgoland, He Dreiht will be made up of 64 turbines planted in the middle of the North Sea. It’s an area known for choppy waters, screaming winter gales, and annual migrations of gannets and porpoises. It also has some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and marine industry.

The driving force behind the project is German publicly-traded energy company, Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW). EnBW builds and maintains energy infrastructure that produces wind power, before selling it to various public and private companies.

They’ve already built two wind farms (Hohe See and Albatros) in a Special Economic Zone off the German coast. Because of this, He Dreiht will be able to make the most of existing infrastructure, including EnBW’s service station on the German mainland.

While the electricity produced by He Dreiht could power the equivalent of 1.1 million homes for a year, most of it has already been secured in power purchase agreements. For companies, it’s an excellent opportunity to work towards their zero-carbon targets. And for EnBW, it’s a key way to secure funding.

Who's building what

EnBW leads the project. They’ll retain 50.1% ownership after selling stakes to Norges Bank Investment Management, AIP Management, and Allianz Capital Partners.

Major contractors include:

• Vestas Wind Systems, supplying all 64 turbines.

• Steelwind Nordenham for monopile manufacture, with the Sif/Smulders consortium providing transition pieces to connect foundations to turbines.

• Heerema Marine Contractors, who handled foundation installation using the Thialf crane vessel.

• Seaway7, currently installing 100km of inter-array cables connecting the turbines.

• TenneT (a Dutch-German grid operator), who will connect the farm to shore via the BorWin5 HVDC system – 120km of underwater cables plus 110km onshore.

Components arrive from multiple countries — turbines from Denmark's Esbjerg port, foundations from various European manufacturers, with project management and operations based in Hamburg and Emden.

Current progress and timeline

Construction began in May 2024 with foundation installation, which is now complete. And the first turbine was installed in April 2025.

In March 2025, Luxembourg’s Seaway7 fleet began installing the 100km of internal cabling that connects the 64 turbines. The project is currently navigating the challenge of coordinating turbine installation and cable work across the 60km² site.

The project aims for full operation by 2026, when it will generate 3.6 billion kWh annually.

‘Zero-subsidy’ financing

He Dreiht represents a significant shift in offshore wind financing: it's among the first German projects built without state subsidies.

Instead, EnBW secured long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with major industrial customers. These include 100MW to Deutsche Telekom, 85MW to Frankfurt Airport operator Fraport, 150MW to chemical company Evonik, and further contracts with Bosch, DHL, and Salzgitter steel.

A €600 million loan from the European Investment Bank helped fund construction, but the project's economics depend entirely on these commercial contracts rather than government support.

Installing the giants

As for the actual turbines, He Dreiht marks the commercial debut of the largest offshore turbine on the market — the Danish-built Vestas V236-15MW. (While New York’s Empire Wind hoped to be the first to use them, progress has been hobbled by a stop-work order).

These turbines stand 142 metres above the North Sea, and have a rotor diameter of 236 metres. Each turbine generates 15MW of energy, bringing the total installed output to 960MW.

To stand in those choppy waters, each turbine is attached to a 70-metre monopile. These monopiles weigh 1,350 tonnes each, and are driven into the seabed at depths of 37-40 metres.

Understandably, installing turbines and monopiles demands specialist vessels. Over 60 vessels and 500+ personnel were mobilised for the foundation installation phase alone.

First off the mark was the floating crane Thialf — one of the biggest boats in the world, which can accommodate 736 people and clocks in at 72,484 tonnes. Operated by Heerema Marine Contractors, Thialf helped maneuver the massive monopile pieces into place, as well as parts of the noise mitigation system.

Navigating the seabed

Unsurprisingly, the geological conditions of the North Sea site required carefully-planned interventions. Pre-installation surveys revealed mixed sand, silt, and clay layers with glacial till deposits, as well as boulders that needed to be removed before installation.

The seabed slopes gently (0.5-1.5°) but required micro-siting adjustments to avoid the risk of foundation subsidence. And, to handle different soil pressures, each monopile needed variable wall thickness (between 45 and 85mm).

Protection against the sea adds another layer of complexity. To protect against scouring, 500kg/m² rock armour surrounds each foundation. And cathodic protection systems protect the metal monopiles from North Sea salinity corrosion.

According to German environmental assessments, the monopile installation process also had to navigate around cold-water coral patches, with exclusion zones established to protect sensitive habitats identified during pre-construction sediment sampling.

The design also tries to account for the potential of more extreme weather as a result of the climate crisis. Seabed reinforcement takes into account 50-year storm surge projections, and turbine foundations include 15% extra capacity for changing wave patterns.

Managing environmental impact

German environmental regulations demanded extensive mitigation measures, particularly for marine mammals and seabirds.

Bubble curtains were deployed during pile driving, to reduce noise below the critical threshold for porpoise protection. Soft-start procedures allowed marine mammals time to leave the area before full piling began.

Between October-November and March-April, when the sky fills with migratory birds, the turbines are equipped with radar to trigger a temporary shutdown. And, to reduce the collision risk for northern gannets, the turbines are spaced 1.2 kilometres apart. To provide compensatory bird habitats, €8.7 million in funding has been invested into conservation on nearby Borkum Island.

Testing commercial viability

He Dreiht is more than the sum of its parts. The project requires executing complex offshore engineering, meeting strict environmental requirements and adhering to commercial timelines. EnBH’s project will also prove whether offshore wind technology has matured enough to work without subsidies.

Installation of the world's largest offshore turbines is a real-world test of whether this scale of technology can deliver reliable, cost-effective power, and whether the industry can rely on commercial contracts with energy-hungry industrial customers. If He Dreiht proves sustainable, the winds of change could be felt far abroad.

On the pod

This week on the pod, Jason and Carlos break down the confusing world of mega project delivery roles - from general contractors to delivery partners and managing contractors. They then discuss the rising trend of framework-style project delivery that's reshaping infrastructure. Finally, the pair analyse the on-again, off-again mega port project backed by China's Belt and Road Initiative.

The Bagamoyo Port project promises to become East Africa's largest maritime hub, handling 20 million containers annually by 2045. That's 25 times larger than Tanzania's current main port, Dar es Salaam.

China has backed the scheme as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, envisioning Bagamoyo as a vital link to Africa’s interior, and to Indian Ocean shipping routes.

But after a decade of stops and starts, the project tells a familiar story of ambitious infrastructure promises meeting political and financial reality.

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East Africa's port wars

Kenya and Tanzania have competed for decades to control East Africa's maritime trade. The Kenyan port of Mombasa and Tanzania's Dar es Salaam traditionally split the business, but both countries are now planning massive expansions.

Kenya is developing a new port at Lamu. Tanzania is pushing Bagamoyo. If completed as planned, both will be larger than any existing port in sub-Saharan Africa.

The competition makes sense. Dar es Salaam handles around 17 million tonnes annually but can't accommodate the largest container ships.

The port's congestion creates major delays — and these ripple through supply chains serving landlocked countries like Rwanda, Burundi, and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Bagamoyo's proposed deep-water berths would handle 8,000+ TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) initially, with future expansion to accommodate 25,000-TEU ships – the largest container vessels in operation.

Construction puzzles

The engineering challenges start with location. Bagamoyo sits at the mouth of the Wami River delta, which creates ongoing sediment accumulation problems.

The project requires dredging 15 million cubic metres of sediment to achieve the 15.5-metre depth of the initial three berths. That sediment will keep returning, requiring continuous maintenance dredging, and racking up Bagamoyo’s operational costs.

Standard ports in calmer harbours face less aggressive waves and lower chloride exposure than open-ocean sites like Bagamoyo.

Because of this, engineers need to use marine-grade concrete with silica fume. These materials can be up to 30% more expensive than cheaper corrosion inhibitors or the epoxy-coated rebar suitable for harbour ports.

The port infrastructure will include a 2.8km curved breakwater using 7-tonne armoured concrete blocks to protect against the Indian Ocean’s massive waves.

Linking it up

A port is only as good as its connections inland. Bagamoyo needs entirely new transport links to function.

The railway component requires a 65km line connecting to Tanzania's existing TAZARA and Central Railway networks. This means building 12 bridges over mangrove estuaries, including a 480-metre span over the Ruvu River — the project's longest single structure.

The railway must also import 54,000 tonnes of UIC60 rails from China, highlighting the project's dependence on Chinese supply chains.

Road connections face their own problems. The planned 34km road to Mlandizi needs laterite soil stabilisation across 18km of swampy terrain — a complex and expensive foundation process.

Material logistics create additional headaches. Construction teams must deliver concrete daily from Dar es Salaam using a fleet of 40 mixer trucks. The 75km journey on the congested Bagamoyo-Dar highway creates bottlenecks that could slow the entire project.

The Special Economic Zone (SEZ)

Beyond the port, Bagamoyo includes plans for a 2,500-hectare Special Economic Zone to support 700+ industries and 15,000 workers.

Phase 1 involves clearing 887 hectares of coastal forest and grading 9,800 hectares total, displacing 180,000 cubic metres of earth. The zone also requires 200km of underground utilities for water, power, and fibre optics.

Industrial buildings will use prefabricated steel structures designed to withstand monsoon winds. Worker housing uses rapid-build modular units — a practical approach given the remote location and tight timeline.

Environmental mitigation adds complexity and cost. The project involves relocating 42 hectares of mangroves using hydraulic dredging techniques. Sediment curtains deployed during dredging aim to protect coral reefs near local fishing grounds.

A 50-megalitre per day desalination plant is planned to avoid straining local aquifers, whilst a circular drainage system with eight retention ponds will prevent seawater intrusion.

A troubled timeline

The project's history reflects the broader challenges facing Belt and Road investments in Africa.

The first framework agreement between Tanzania, China, and Oman was signed in 2013. Original partners included China Merchants Holdings and Oman's sovereign wealth fund in a joint venture structure. In 2015, former president Jakaya Kikwete promised the port would be completed within three years.

However, by 2019, then-President John Magufuli suspended the project, accusing China of imposing "exploitative terms," including excessive tax exemptions and compensation for operating losses. China Merchants Holdings and Oman's SGRF exited due to disputes over revised terms.

Current President Samia Suluhu Hassan relaunched negotiations with China Merchants Holdings in 2021, describing them as "a national priority." As AEDIC Consultants explain, the port isn’t just about infrastructure — it’s both “a symbol of China's growing influence in Africa and Tanzania's vision of becoming a global logistics hub.”

In 2024, the government completed compensation for landowners displaced by the SEZ — a necessary step that had delayed progress for years. Work officially began in 2025 with an initial budget allocation of TZS 22 billion (approximately $9.3 million) for Phase 1 berth foundations and access roads.

The current status of the project

As of February 2025, Tanzania has signed memoranda of understanding with companies from China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. But these cover only preliminary activities, not actual port construction.

Plasduce Mbossa, the Tanzania Ports Authority Director General, emphasised the modest scope, clarifying that MoUs entered with those firms cover preliminary activities, not the construction of the port.

The project faces practical constraints that affect most major African infrastructure developments. Tanzania's 2021 Local Content Regulations require 45% of materials to be sourced domestically by 2026. Monsoon delays are built into planning, with 14-week annual work stoppages anticipated during heavy rains.

On the pod

This week, the team covers: the merger between Australian platform E1 and UK-based C-Link; the record-breaking $3-4 billion flowing into construction tech startups in early 2025; and Acciona topping the UK contractor league table for the first time with a £400 million waterworks win.

West Africa is attempting something ambitious: building a highway across five countries. The Abidjan-Lagos Corridor will stretch 1,028 kilometres along the coast, linking Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria in a six-lane highway that aims to transform regional trade.

The $15.6 billion project promises to connect nearly 40 million people and serve as the backbone of West African commerce. It's designed to link major ports, integrate economic hubs, and provide landlocked Sahel nations with better access to Atlantic shipping.

But coordinating construction across five different countries presents challenges that go well beyond typical highway engineering.

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Why build across borders?

The corridor connects some of West Africa's most economically dynamic cities – from Abidjan through Accra, Lomé, and Cotonou to Lagos. According to the African Development Bank, the area’s collective urban population is expected to reach 173 million people by 2050.

As Mike Salawou explains, the goal is to create an "economic corridor approach" that supports major economic clusters and improves links between large urban centres and rural areas within all five countries. It’s an area that makes up 75% of West African trade — so a faster, better-connected route could have a huge impact on the regional economy.

The highway is also part of the larger Trans-African Highway Network, meaning it will eventually link to corridors that serve landlocked countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. These inland nations currently rely on fragmented transport networks to reach coastal ports.

The project also runs parallel to existing infrastructure. The West African gas pipeline from Nigeria to Ghana covers over 80% of the corridor length, and several fibre optic projects follow similar routes.

A highway through West Africa

The route traverses a huge swathe of different landscapes.

Coastal sections face tidal surges and erosion, particularly around Lagos and Cotonou, which will require breakwaters and reinforced embankments for the huge highway.

Inland areas present different problems. Hilly regions in Ghana, including the Akwapim-Togo ranges, require extensive cut-and-fill earthworks. Nigeria's Badagry-Seme border stretch runs through waterlogged soil that will demand specialised piling techniques to stabilise the roadbed.

The highway must navigate ecologically sensitive lagoons, marshes (including parts of the Niger Delta), and flood-prone coastal plains. This requires elevated structures, reinforced foundations, and erosion-resistant designs in multiple locations.

Then there’s the challenges of urban areas. In densely built up cities like Lagos and Abidjan, construction demands land acquisition, resettlement, and careful integration with existing infrastructure.

Needless to say, all these are potential sources of delays and cost overruns.

The coordination challenge

Building across five countries means harmonising technical standards for everything from lane widths to signage. Each country has different procurement processes, regulatory frameworks and construction standards.

The Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Management Authority (ALCoMA) was established to streamline governance. And the whole project falls under the remit of ECOWAS — twelve countries who make up the Economic Community of West African States.

In a recent update on Nigeria’s progress, Federal Controller of Works Olukorede Kesha said that 46.2km of Nigeria’s 79-kilometre section has been awarded to as-yet-unnamed independent contractors. Work on it was due to start in May this year.

Another stretch of Nigeria’s section falls under the Federal Roads Maintenance Agency, and the first 10km of the corridor is managed by capital city Lagos’ state government.

This fragmented approach is necessary, given the array of governance structures. Still, it complicates overall project coordination. And these are just the regulatory bodies of one country — progress varies significantly across the region.

On a higher-level, the African Development Bank has invested in a spatial development initiative for the highway project, which has included coordinating international engineers from CPCS (Canada), Holland & Hausberger (South Africa) and Comete Engineering (Tunisia). It’s not clear which other contractors are involved, although independent contractors for construction will be selected through international tenders after the final design and financing phases conclude.

As might be becoming clear, bureaucratic hurdles persist in and across each nation.

Current construction reality

Despite all the promises, actual construction remains limited. The highway's design includes four to six lanes in most sections, expanding to eight lanes approaching Lagos.

Current work focuses on three-lane carriageways, currently without service lanes. Future plans include potential light rail and bus rapid transit corridors to serve local communities, but these remain aspirational. 63 interchanges have also been planned across the entire stretch.

The project also requires linking the highway to ports, inland corridors, and eight border posts. Elevated interchanges and smart toll systems are planned to manage traffic, though how these will be implemented remain unclear.

Funding and timeline

The African Investment Forum pledged $15.6 billion USD in potential investment in 2021, but securing actual funding has proven difficult. The project relies on blended financing from the African Development Bank, EU, and private partnerships — and it’s not clear what the total price-tag will be, although most sources suggest it is around the $15B mark.

Progress has been slow. Delays in securing funds and land rights mean that, despite the project launching in 2017, most progress has been in the form of preparatory studies and financing agreements.

With a few regional variations, most work was supposedly due to commence in 2026 for completion by 2030. As mentioned, Nigeria has already started on smaller sections that will be linked up as other countries complete their part of the project.

The ECOWAS website maintains an active presence, and regularly reports on stakeholder meetings, steering committees, and workshops. The sustained diplomatic energy suggests serious commitment, but moving from meetings to actual construction has proven challenging.

So, will it actually happen?

The project's economic potential is clear. Connecting major West African cities and ports through improved infrastructure should boost regional trade and integration. And, while significant, the engineering challenges are solvable with sufficient resources and expertise.

Coordinating five governments, their different standards, and competing political priorities may prove more difficult.

Each country faces domestic pressures that could affect their commitment to the regional project. Economic downturns, political changes, or competing infrastructure priorities could derail progress in any of the countries.

For now, the Corridor exists primarily as feasibility studies, MOUs, and diplomatic initiatives.

On the pod

This week on the pod, the team look at Japan's $60 billion Chuo Shinkansen Maglev project; Germany’s €500 billion infrastructure fund; and how construction tech companies manage to explain — or not — what exactly they do.

As usual, we’ll be exploring a momentous construction project — but this time, it’s not just a single project, but an entire city.

The Nusantara project in Indonesia doesn’t just involve building a vast presidential palace, clearing a 2,500km² swathe of eucalyptus forest, or constructing a city’s-worth of green energy infrastructure.

It’s all of these, but also public transport, roads, bridges, dams, an international airport, schools, shops, offices and houses, water, sewerage, electricity and telecommunications infrastructure…

It takes a lot to make a city. And Indonesia is building one from scratch.

The problem with Jakarta

Indonesia is facing an urban crisis.

Its capital city, Jakarta, is one of the most densely populated cities in Southeast Asia. 32.6 million people live in the greater metropolitan area, and the central city is home to 10.67 million people.

With brutal congestion issues and a growing urban population, Jakarta’s infrastructure is strained beyond capacity. Also, the city is sinking.

Jakarta’s flooding is made worse by its colonial-era infrastructure, which wasn’t designed for the wet tropics. Much of its water supply is withdrawn from groundwater, lowering the water table and causing parts of the city to sink up to 25 centimetres a year.

Combining all this with rising sea levels and worsening monsoon seasons means that Jakarta’s flooding will only get worse. A history of incremental fixes hasn’t meaningfully shifted the dial.

The government’s solution? Build a new capital, 2,000 kilometres away.

Relocating Indonesia’s centre

Jakarta’s problems aren’t new, and neither is the solution of moving the capital—it was first suggested during the Suharto regime in the 1980s. What’s new is the idea of building it from scratch.

Indonesia is carving Nusantara out of the East Kalimantan region, on the island of Borneo. The $35 billion project aims to relocate the seat of power, encourage migration, and ease pressure on Jakarta by 2045.

This isn't a complete relocation of Jakarta's population—the goal is to take the pressure off Jakarta, and signal Indonesia’s ambition to the rest of the world. Nusantara aims to have 1.9 million residents by 2045.

Planning Minister Suharso Monoarfa said that “The new capital has a central function and is a symbol of the identity of the nation, as well as a new center of economic gravity.” Widodo has described the old Jakarta palaces as "overshadowed" by a "colonial smell."

Others have a more jaded view: Stephen Sherlock, Professor at ANU’s Southeast Asia Institute, explains that, "In no sense is it an economic centre of Indonesia or a demographic centre. It's just that if you look on a map, it looks like it's roughly in the centre of Indonesia."

A new home in the rainforest

Nusantara is an Indonesian word for ‘archipelago.’ Also referred to as IKN (Ibu Kota Negara, ‘Nusantara Capital City’), the building of Indonesia’s new national capital was announced by Former President Joko Widodo in 2019, and work began in 2022.

While much of the rest of Borneo is tropical rainforest—including protected orangutan habitat—the Nusantara site is carved out of 2,500km² of eucalyptus plantation.

The remoteness of East Kalimantan means building basic connectivity infrastructure from scratch is necessary before anything else can happen.

When complete, the city will run on solar, wind, and hydropower. Nusantara’s proponents regularly point to its clean, green aspirations: ‘low carbon emissions’ is fourth in Nusantara’s eight ‘guiding principles’.

But, its construction is largely powered by East Kalimantan coal — the region has four of the five biggest coal mines in the country. Five new dams have also been planned on the Kayan River to support the development.

The construction timeline

The project is structured in five phases, running until 2045.

Phase I (2022-2024) focussed on core government buildings and housing for civil servants. Officials say they've completed the state palace, government offices, civil servant apartments, toll roads, bridges, and water supply infrastructure.

Though much surrounding infrastructure remained unfinished, former President Widodo began working from the new presidential palace in August 2024.

Nusantara International Airport opened in late 2024 with a 3,000-metre runway, and can currently serve narrow-bodied aircraft.

Phase II (2025-2029) will expand legislative and judicial complexes. Plans include 97 apartment blocks and 129 low-rise residential buildings. The government allocated 48.8 trillion IDR ($2.8 billion) from the state budget for this phase.

Mass public transportation systems and connections to nearby Samarinda City are planned for the final 2040-2045 phase. A toll road between Nusantara and the seaport city of Balikpapan is already more than 90% complete.

‘Smart city’ ambitions

On top of its basic infrastructure, Nusantara aims to be a "smart forest city" with 75% green space and carbon neutrality by 2045.

The digital infrastructure includes a National Data Centre with 160 petabytes of storage, 5G networks, and an Integrated Command and Control Centre.

The government has published a broad outline of what is planned and what has been completed, but many details remain high-level or are still evolving.

Who's building what

The Nusantara Capital Authority (NCA) coordinates overall development. The Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing supervises Indonesian construction firms for government buildings and infrastructure.

Seven initial investors have completed feasibility studies for residential development, with investment potentially reaching 150 trillion Rupiah.

CITIC Construction (China) leads residential development, responsible for up to 60 residential towers primarily for civil servants under a public-private partnership scheme. Representatives and analysts have identified China’s significant investment in Nusantara as part of its Belt & Road Initiative.

Indonesian state enterprises handle significant portions. PT Nindya Karya is involved in feasibility studies and residential towers. PT Perintis Triniti Properti, PT Intiland Development, and Ciputra Group are all working on housing projects.

Malaysian companies IJM Corporation and Maxim Global are participating in residential tower development.

Specialised facilities go to specific agencies. Pos Indonesia is building the logistics hub. Radio Republik Indonesia is constructing broadcasting facilities.

Many contracts remain in feasibility or bidding stages.

The funding problem

The government's plan relies on private investment covering 80% of the $35 billion cost. This hasn't materialised as hoped.

Investment Minister Bahlil Lahadalia told lawmakers that insufficient foreign capital had come forward, blaming incomplete core infrastructure. Finance Minister Sri Mulyani said the government had spent $4.5 billion over the last three years.

Attracting private investment requires meaningful incentives. To try to attract more investors, the Indonesian government has promised significant tax breaks and land rights for up to 190 years.

Still, public opinion remains mixed. A 2021 survey by the Indonesian Survey Institute found widespread concern about the project's economic and social implications. After all, moving the capital was first proposed in the 1980s. And recent purpose-built cities like Malaysia’s Forest City are evidence that even if a metropolis is built, it’s another thing convincing people to live there.

Progress and politics

Current President Subianto, who succeeded Widodo in 2024, maintains committed. But some critical infrastructure including water and housing systems remains incomplete or delayed. And the actual development pace is lagging behind official targets.

IKN's success depends on maintaining political support across multiple presidential terms–and, at the same time, building a functional city from scratch faster than private investors lose patience.

For now, it's a half-built capital serving a few government functions, with most of the ambitious infrastructure still on paper. Whether Indonesia can execute this vision while meeting environmental and timeline goals remains to be seen.

On the pod

This week, Jason and Carlos discuss funding for a smart hardhat workforce tracking startup, explain why construction events aren’t very interesting, and debate the merits of go-to-market approaches for construction tech businesses.

Beneath the mountains of central Japan, engineers are tackling something extraordinary: the Chūō Shinkansen maglev.

It’s part of Japan’s network of superfast shinkansen (bullet trains), and promises to slash journey times between Tokyo and Nagoya to just 40 minutes.

With 86% of its 286km route running underground — including a 25km stretch beneath Japan’s Southern Alps – this project combines massive tunnelling challenges with cutting-edge magnetic levitation technology.

But the ¥9 trillion ($60 billion) megaproject also faces serious obstacles that have pushed its completion from 2027 to at least 2034.

Let’s break it down.

A 603 km/h train

The Chūō Shinkansen uses Superconducting Magnetic Levitation (SCMAGLEV) technology, allowing the shinkansen trains to float 10cm above the guideway. During testing in 2015, a prototype reached an astonishing 603km/h.

This means developing a totally different infrastructure from conventional rail — precision-engineered guideways, superconducting magnets, and specialized power systems.

Putting all this inside deep tunnels – while maintaining safety systems, proper ventilation, and emergency evacuation routes – adds another layer of complexity to an already challenging project.

Stations below stations

The most striking aspect of the Chūō Shinkansen is the sheer scale of its underground construction. According to Japan Railpass, “Almost 90% of the 286-kilometer line to Nagoya will be built through tunnels or underground.”

The current Tokaido Shinkansen runs mostly above ground, but geological challenges and urban density have pushed the new line deep below the surface.

That means that a key challenge is building this faster, underground line without disrupting the existing network. At Shinagawa and Nagoya, new shinkansen stations will be built directly beneath active rail lines and stations.

Tunnelling through fault lines

The entire route crosses some of Japan's most complex geology, including major fault lines – the Central Structural Line and the Itoigawa-Shizuoka Tectonic Line. These create zones of fractured, unstable rock that make tunnelling much harder.

Different sections present unique challenges. Near the Fujino-Aikawa Structural Line, the rock is extensively fractured. On the other hand, the Southern Alps section has high-quality sedimentary rocks alongside sections with serpentinite – a material that expands and puts serious pressure on tunnel structures.

The tunnel will reach depths of approximately 1,400 metres below the surface, requiring specialised excavation techniques and equipment. That also means a lot of testing. JR Central (Japan’s main high-speed-rail operator for the central region) has already drilled pilot tunnels ahead of and parallel to the main tunnel to check geological conditions before the main excavation.

High-pressure groundwater is another big hurdle. Engineers expect "rock deterioration due to pressure and large volumes of water seepage" in several sections, requiring specialised reinforcement techniques.

Excavation at scale

The sheer quantity of excavated material presents some pretty unique logistical challenges. The Tokyo-Nagoya section alone will generate enough excavated material to fill the Tokyo Dome stadium 45 times. Environmental advocates have drawn attention to the fact that JR Central hasn’t yet decided where all this excavated rock will be permanently placed.

Major construction companies including Kajima Corporation (leading tunnelling and depot construction), JR Tokai Construction/Tobishima Corporation (joint ventures for stations and depots), and Shimizu/Obayashi Corporations (key partners in urban tunnelling) are developing specialized techniques to address these unique challenges.

Importantly, these concerns aren't merely technical — they've become politically contentious. In Shizuoka Prefecture, former Governor Heita Kawakatsu blocked construction permits for over a decade, citing risks to the Oi River's water supply. The Oi is critical for local agriculture, particularly for the tea industry that represents 36% of Japan's total production.

Timeline and current status

The Japanese government approved the project in 2011, and construction began in 2014. As of early 2025, it's only about 15% complete overall, with some sections racing ahead and others at a total standstill.

The 42.8km test track in Yamanashi Prefecture is fully operational, and the Yamanashi section of the Southern Alps tunnel is about 70% complete. But the critical Shizuoka section remains completely stalled due to environmental disputes, and hasn’t progressed since 2016.

These delays have pushed the Tokyo-Nagoya opening date from the original target of 2027 to at least 2034. According to some estimates, 2037 is more likely.

On the other hand, the project’s second phase — extending the line to Osaka — has seen its timeline accelerated. From initial estimates of a 2045 opening, Japan Railpass reports that “the government has pledged to speed up progress on the line and secured extra funding to expedite the process. The Osaka extension is now scheduled to open in 2037."

Escalating costs

Unsurprisingly, costs just keep going up. In 2021, JR Central confirmed an increase in construction costs of ¥1.5 trillion ($13.7 billion), taking the total cost of the Tokyo-Nagoya section to ¥7.04 trillion ($48.1 billion).

JR Central has said this was mostly due to the challenging construction work at terminal stations (¥500 billion of the increase) and the host of geological uncertainties they covered.

The rail company has said it will fund these increases "primarily through operating cash flow and the remaining through loans.” Notably, there’s a caveat: “If the company anticipates that it can no longer ensure sound management and stable dividends, it will aim to complete the construction by adjusting the pace of construction.”

So, even 2037 might be optimistic.

On the pod

This week, Jason and Carlos offer their takes on three critical construction and tech topics.

• A look at New York's $5 billion offshore wind farm recently halted by a federal stop work order, and what project suspensions mean for construction teams.

• Who's responsible when AI tools provide inaccurate information? The hosts examine the complex relationship between users, technology providers, and legal frameworks.

• Should construction tech companies focus on the ENR 400 or the thousands of smaller firms?

As usual, we’re deep-diving into a monumental construction project — this time, the 18-kilometre long Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link tunnel that will be buried forty metres below the surface of the Baltic Sea.

The tunnel will connect the German island of Fehmarn to Denmark’s Lolland island, cutting travel between the two islands from a 35 minute ferry trip to seven minutes by train, or ten minutes by road.

It’s a tale of big dreams, porpoises, and some seriously heavy Danish engineering — come with us as we break it down!

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Beating the bottleneck

The Fehmarn Belt is the waterway between the Danish island of Lolland and the German island of Fehmarn. It connects the Bay of Kiel to the Bay of Mecklenburg, and is part of a major Baltic Sea shipping route.

The Fehmarnbelt tunnel will largely replace the existing ferry service, a major existing bottleneck in the journey between Scandinavia and continental Europe.

On a good day, it takes about five hours to get between Denmark’s capital city, and Germany’s busy port city of Hamburg. With the Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link in place, that five-hour travel time is set to almost halve.

The tunnel will have a two-lane motorway and a double-track, high speed electric train-line. Each section is separated into its own tunnel section to maximise safety, meaning the overall tunnel structure is divided into four interior sections.

Buried, not bedrock

An 18 kilometre-long tunnel is impressive enough on its own. But the Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link is a record-breaking endeavour — when completed, it will be three times longer than the current longest undersea immersed tunnel, San Francisco’s Transbay Tube.

Longer undersea tunnels exist, like Norway’s undersea network, but they’re all blasted directly through bedrock.

Unlike these tunnels, the Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link will be made up of 89 concrete elements sunk into a trench, connected together and buried. At its deepest point, the tunnel will be forty metres below water. We’ll get into the details later on.

Solutions to the ferry bottleneck have been imagined for decades. As early as the 1960s, infrastructure like smaller bridges, roads and rail connections was developed with the goal of eventually tackling the Fehmarn crossing.

In the 90s, the Fixed Link was imagined as an enormous railway and road bridge. But in 2010, it was decided that a tunnel was more cost-effective, less environmentally invasive, and more resilient to the climate conditions of the Baltic Sea.

Conservation advocates still aren’t happy, especially with the amount of disruption to the habitats of porpoises and other marine life during the construction phase, but these concerns have mostly been overridden.

Denmark’s largest infrastructure investment

The Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link is Denmark’s largest ever infrastructure project, and they are wholly responsible for financing it. Currently, it’s projected to cost €7.4 billion. The EU is contributing €1.1B to the project, and the rest is ‘user-financed’ — as in, road and rail tolls will finance the repayment of loans. According to Danish state-owned infrastructure company Sund & Bælt, those loans are expected to be repaid by the year 2057.

Femern A/S, under Sund & Bælt, are in charge of the project. The main technical advisors and consultants are a three-way joint venture between Danish company Rambøll, British multinational Arup and Dutch TEC.

Danish-led FLC and Dutch FBC are the two contractor consortia, tasked with managing more than a dozen specialised contractors. The vast project involves a huge range of labour, from engineering, dredging and construction, to in-tunnel electric components, worker housing, and transport.

How to build an undersea tunnel

So, what actually goes into constructing an 18 kilometre-long undersea tunnel?

The Fixed Link will be built by submerging prefabricated tunnel components (89 in total) in a trench dredged from the Fehmarn Belt seafloor. Then, it will be packed in with gravel and covered in earth.

Dredging of the 12-meter deep, 100-meter wide, gravel-lined trench began in Denmark in 2020. But ground was broken far earlier — in 2011, with the preparation of a purpose-built factory sites in Lolland’s Rødbyhavn, and working harbours at both ends of the project.

According to Femern S&B, “Customised dredgers such as the Hopper Dredger, Vox Amalia, the Wire Grab Dredger Manta and Magnor, the world’s largest Backhoe Dredger, were used for the operation.”

These Transformer-like vehicles removed almost 15 million cubic metres of soil, stone and sand from the seafloor, and the subsea material they removed will be used to create recreation and nature spaces on Lolland. That dredging work was completed in mid-2024.

Work at sea also involved the construction of two permanent new coastlines out of 2 million tonnes of Norwegian granite.

The world’s largest tunnel factory

The Rødbyhavn site has been billed as the world’s largest tunnel factory.

Inside, the tunnel segments are crafted with minute detail that belies their massive size. Iron rebar is cut and welded onsite, making the tunnel section frames that are then methodically cast in concrete. To prevent excessive cracking, swelling or shrinkage of the concrete, the concrete segments are cured for 30-60 hours in a climate-controlled section of the factory.

After this, they’re closed at either end with a waterproof bulkhead and stored in a drydock. When the time comes, the drydocks will be flooded and, despite their enormous weight, the tunnel sections will float, allowing them to be towed out to sea by tug boats and submerged at the specific point of the trench site.

Each of the 79 standard elements clocks in at 73,000 tonnes: made of nine segments each, they are 217 metres long, 42 metres wide and 10 metres high. The other 10 elements are shorter but wider.

This casting work began in 2023, and, as of February 2025, two completed elements have left the Rødbyhavn factory.

An accelerating timeline

The process for the Fixed Link officially began in 2008, when Denmark and Germany signed a long-awaited State Treaty on the issue. In 2011, the idea of building a tunnel instead of a bridge was officially signed off on.

After decades of dreaming, the tunnel is intended to fully open in 2029.

With two layers of seals, secured with heavy-duty gaskets, and encased in hundreds of thousands of tonnes of concrete, the Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link tunnel is engineered to last 120 years.

On the pod

This week, Jason and Carlos welcome special guest Kelvin Kumangai to break down the reasons every engineer should get their hands dirty in construction.

The team also chat non-software construction innovations, and the EU’s warning on contractor underbidding tensions.

Tune in to catch the conversation!

This week, we’re looking at Empire Wind — a massive project to supply New York’s energy grid with over 810MW of green electricity.

Located 15-30 miles off the New York coast, Empire Wind is an ambitious project. Its operational date has been pushed back time and time again, and they’ve faced challenges from planning permissions and thwarted joint ventures to wrangling some of the world’s biggest wind turbines.

Until today, the winds of fortune seemed to be favouring New York State’s biggest offshore project. But with the latest order to halt construction, the future of the megaproject is in doubt.

Come along as we break it down for you!

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A 2GW wind farm

If built, Empire Wind will be made up of 54 turbines, arrayed in a triangle taking up 80,000 acres of the New York Bight. Each of these turbines can produce 15MW of energy, making the planned capacity for the whole project 810-816 MW — enough to power 500,000 New York homes.

And that number is just for Empire Wind 1. Since its inception, the project was intended to have phases, with Empire Wind 2 including 80 more turbines, bringing the capacity of the whole project up to 2GW.

Compared to the three other operational wind farms in the US, Empire Wind is huge. Block Island has 5 6MW turbines. Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind has 2, also 6MW. And South Fork, the biggest currently operational offshore wind project, has 12 11MW turbines.

Given a slew of permitting, procurement and political interruptions, the fate of Empire Wind 2 is still up in the air. But until today, Empire 1 was charging ahead, with New York authorities expecting commercial operations to begin in 2027.

An international endeavour

So, with a project this big, who’s involved?

• US coastal waters are divided into grid-like federal leases, leased by the federal government to companies who collaborate with local industry and state governments. In the case of Empire Wind 1, that company is Norway’s Equinor.
  
  In 2017, they acquired a lease as part of a 50/50 joint venture with British energy giants BP. But in 2024, Equinor took full ownership of Empire Wind, and BP did the same for Beacon Wind, another formerly-joint project further north.

• French company Nexans were awarded a contract to make and install the two 230kV underwater export cables connecting Empire Wind to the Sunset Park onshore substation. That substation is located at the South Brooklyn Marine Terminal (SBMT), which we’ll come back to.

• Danish company COWI has designed, and is currently fabricating, the monopiles that the 54 turbines will be mounted on.

• Maersk (Denmark) is constructing a new Wind Installation Vessel, and Kirby (USA) will build and maintain two new tugboats to transport turbine components from the SBMT to the Empire Wind lease area to the south-east.

• US-owned marine transportation company Edison Chouest Offshore has been chartered to house 60 wind turbine technicians during both the construction phase and for ongoing maintenance.

• And Vestas, a Danish company, are contributing the turbines themselves — massive structures with a tip height of 270 metres, just 60 metres shorter than the Eiffel Tower.

What does it involve?

Even now, with construction underway, not everything is set in stone.

At its shallowest point, the lease area is 22 metres deep. At its deepest, it’s 41. The New York Bight is also known for its choppy weather — which, while a logistical challenge, is also partly why it’s a great spot for a major wind project.

The turbines

The rest of the infrastructure is critical, but it’s the turbines that are really exciting.

Empire Wind 1 is using Vestas’ only offshore turbine model, the V236 15MW. Launched in 2021, they were the first 15MW turbine on the market — they’re big, and as powerful as they currently get. The swept area of each turbine is 43,742 m², and each of their three blades are 115.5 metres long.

Vestas claims that they can operate at a capacity factor of over 60%, making them one of the highest capacity turbines on the market. Offshore turbines have higher capability and output than onshore ones, but even so, that puts the capacity factor of these turbines significantly higher than average.

And Vestas’ offshore turbines are built to last: from tropical cyclones to the gales of Nordic waters, they’re “rated to withstand IEC 1 extreme wind conditions up to 50 m/s and IEC T up to 57 m/s.”

The foundations

COWI is designing, building, and installing the monopiles to fix the turbines to the seabed of the New York Bight.

Much of the site research involved analysing and modelling how the site’s soil behaves, as well as the potential pressure of waves on the structures.

A major concern for COWI and Equinor’s other contractors is how to install and maintain the fixtures without disturbing marine life. One approach will involve the use of bubble curtains to provide shields against the significant ongoing noise of the turbine/monopile structures.

The energy transfer

Nexans’ cables will transfer the energy to the South Brooklyn Marine Terminal. That underwater route is 24 kilometres long — and, to avoid interference with fishing equipment and anchors, the two cables will be buried approximately 1.8 metres below the seabed.

South Brooklyn Marine Terminal is a pre-existing terminal in the Upper New York Bay. Ground has been broken on its upgrades, which will involve updating an electrical substation, and equipping the terminal to serve as a base site for the rest of the project.

Offshore infrastructure like the monopiles and turbines will be assembled at the terminal and transported from there to the lease site.

As mentioned, part of the SBMT is Sunset Park, an onshore substation. From Sunset Park, Empire Wind’s electricity will be connected into a new substation, Gowanus, constructed by local NY energy company Con Edison. That ConEd project will transform Empire Wind 1 into the first offshore wind project to connect directly into the local NYC grid.

What does it cost? And what’s going on with Trump?

Equinor has said that the whole Empire Wind 1 project will cost $5B USD, $3B of which is currently secured.

Even under the relatively favourable conditions of the Biden administration, Empire Wind already faced financial ups and downs, including the fallout from the COVID pandemic, rising costs, and inflationary pressures.

On the 20th of January 2025, US President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order temporarily withdrawing areas on the Outer Continental Shelf from being available as federal leases for offshore wind projects, as well as reviewing the Federal Government’s leasing and permitting practices for wind projects.

Until today, this executive order hasn’t actually halted any current works. What it has done is produce severe uncertainty in the plethora of proposed and unstarted projects.

Despite this, Empire Wind 1 is striking out ahead. Works are underway at the South Brooklyn Marine Terminal with turbine delivery expected in 2026. Unless the Trump administration gets its way and manages to reverse an already-permitted project, commercial operations are slated to begin in 2027.

On the pod

This week on the podcast, Jason and Carlos dive deep on three key construction industry topics: The Hudson Tunnel Project, a LinkedIn debate about tech vendor pricing, and the ins and outs of Brisbane’s 2032 Olympic delivery plan.

Has Brisbane left its planning way too late? How urgent is New York’s Hudson Tunnel Project? Should contractors be wary of tech vendors offering suspiciously low prices? Tune in and find out.

Welcome to another issue of The Off Site!

This week, we're examining one of the most critical infrastructure projects in the United States: the Hudson Tunnel Project.

This is a cornerstone of the larger Gateway Program that promises to revolutionize rail travel between New Jersey and New York City.

After decades of proposals, false starts, and political battles, this $16 billion megaproject has finally secured full federal funding and broken ground.

Let's dive in.

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What is the Hudson Tunnel Project?

The Hudson Tunnel Project addresses a critical vulnerability in America's busiest rail corridor—the deteriorating, century-old North River Tunnel beneath the Hudson River.

At its core, the project consists of three major components:

1. New Hudson River Tunnel. This is the construction of a brand-new, two-track tunnel beneath the Hudson River connecting New Jersey to Manhattan, providing much-needed redundancy and expanded capacity.

2. Hudson Yards Concrete Casing. This is the completion of a concrete tunnel box beneath Manhattan's Hudson Yards development that preserves the right-of-way for the new tunnel to connect into Penn Station.

3. North River Tunnel Rehabilitation: Once the new tunnel is operational, a comprehensive renovation of the existing 1910-built tunnel that was severely damaged during Hurricane Sandy in 2012.

When completed, the system will feature four modern rail tubes under the Hudson River instead of the current two, doubling capacity and allowing for operational flexibility.

This will allow for continued service during maintenance and emergencies, significantly reducing the delays that currently plague the Northeast Corridor

A single point of failure

Why is it needed? The existing North River Tunnel (NRT) was completed in 1910 by the Pennsylvania Railroad. With just two single-track tubes running beneath the Hudson River, it creates what engineers call a "one-track-in, one-track-out" bottleneck serving approximately 450 Amtrak and NJ Transit trains and nearly 200,000 passengers daily.

The tunnel's vulnerabilities were exposed when Hurricane Sandy flooded it with millions of gallons of seawater in 2012. The salt water left behind corrosive chemicals that continue to degrade the tunnel's concrete liner, bench walls, and critical systems. Twelve years later, the damage manifests as increasingly frequent service disruptions.

According to the Gateway Development Commission, "When an incident takes one tube out of service, traffic in and out of Penn Station must use the one remaining tube, reducing capacity by up to 75% and leading to significant delays. The 24 trains per hour that use the NRT in peak periods could drop to as few as six when just one tube is closed."

One report estimated that the North River Tunnels and the adjacent Portal Bridge contributed to over 2,000 hours of delays between 2014 and 2018 alone.

The long path to groundbreaking

The Hudson Tunnel Project emerged in 2011 after then-New Jersey Governor Chris Christie canceled the Access to the Region's Core (ARC) project. Unlike ARC, which would have terminated at a new station beneath 34th Street, Gateway connects directly to existing Penn Station tracks.

Federal support for the project has fluctuated dramatically with changing administrations. The Obama administration designated Gateway as a critical national priority, the Trump administration reclassified it as "local," and the Biden administration reinstated it as essential infrastructure.

By July 2024, funding commitments included $12 billion in federal support and $4 billion from regional stakeholders. The Full-Funding Grant Agreement signed that month represents the largest federal investment in mass transit infrastructure in modern American history.

Engineering challenges

The project faces formidable engineering challenges, particularly in tunneling beneath the Hudson River. The riverbed on the Manhattan side has been described as having "a chocolate pudding consistency" that requires extensive stabilization before tunnel boring machines can safely pass through.

The tunnel under the Palisades in New Jersey represents another significant challenge. Before construction could begin, the project team needed to acquire easements for over 200 properties sitting above the tunnel route—even though some are as much as 250 feet above the planned tunnel alignment.

According to the Gateway Development Commission’s Chief of Public Outreach Steve Sigmund, the tunnel boring process itself requires custom machines tailored to the specific geology. "You can't use some old boring machine unless it happened to have matched up exactly with that diameter, which none ever do. You also have to have a very specific drill bit depending on what kind of rock you're going through. In this case, it's a pretty hard shale."

Work packages and major contractors

The project has been broken into distinct work packages, with seven either awarded or under active procurement.

• Tonnelle Avenue Bridge and Utility Relocation: Construction began in late 2023 by Conti Civil, LLC with construction management by Naik Consulting Group; market case estimate of $47.3 million; expected completion in 2025.

• Hudson Yards Concrete Casing–Section 3: Construction began November 2023; expected completion in 2026.

• Hudson River Ground Stabilization: Early surveying began in May 2024 with heavy construction starting in summer 2024, led by Weeks Marine, Inc. The contract for the HRGS Project is valued at approximately $284 million, with Phase Two expected to conclude in 2027.

• Palisades Tunnel Project: Schiavone Dragados Lane JV awarded $465 million contract (plus contingencies) in August 2024; expected completion in 2027.

• Manhattan Tunnel Project: Frontier-Kemper-Tutor-Perini JV awarded $1.18 billion contract in February 2025; expected completion in 2029.

• Hudson River Tunnel Project: This is the center portion of the new tunnel. Currently in procurement. Shortlisted ventures are:

  • Gateway Tunnel Contractors (Halmar International LLC and FCC Construction Inc.)

  • Hudson Tunnel Constructors (Dragados USA Inc., Schiavone Construction Co. LLC, and The Lane Construction Corp.)

  • Traylor/Walsh/Skanska JV (Traylor Bros. Inc., Walsh Construction Co. II LLC, and Skanska USA Civil Northeast Inc.).

• New Jersey Surface Alignment Project: In procurement with shortlisted contractors identified; timeline pending.

• Program Management: Mace-Parsons-Arcadis (MPA) joint venture selected February 2024 as delivery partner; Gateway Trans-Hudson Partnership (WSP, AECOM, STV) providing technical design and support.

Current status

Construction officially launched in November 2023 with work beginning simultaneously on both sides of the Hudson:

1. In North Bergen, NJ: The Tonnelle Avenue Bridge and Utility Relocation Project broke ground, providing access to the future tunnel portal and entry point for tunnel boring machines.

2. In Manhattan: Work commenced on the Hudson Yards Concrete Casing–Section 3, preserving the right-of-way for the tunnel to connect to Penn Station through the massive Hudson Yards development.

3. In the Hudson River: The Hudson River Ground Stabilization Project began fortifying sections of the riverbed to allow tunnel boring machines to safely excavate beneath.

The new tunnel is expected to be in service in 2035, with the project completed in 2038.

On the podcast this week

On the podcast this week, the team discuss the Lyon-Turin high-speed rail's timeline challenges, and the implications of a major Australian builder's collapse.

They also cover a Colorado highway dispute with $14M legal fees for a $5M victory that highlights the industry's litigious culture.

This week, we're diving deep into one of Europe's most ambitious infrastructure projects: the Lyon-Turin high-speed railway.

The project includes the world's longest railway tunnel, cutting through the Alps to connect two major European economies.

It's a project decades in the making, beset by political wrangling, technical challenges, and passionate opposition — yet it continues to advance toward completion.

Let's explore the twists, turns and breakthroughs of this monumental undertaking.

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Milan to Paris in four hours

The Lyon-Turin high-speed rail project is part of the European Union's TEN-T network, specifically the Mediterranean Corridor (the green line in the map below) that will eventually link Algeciras in Spain to Budapest in Hungary.

Spanning 270 kilometers, the new line aims to improve both passenger and freight transport between Italy and France.

First conceived in the early 1990s, the project has undergone numerous feasibility studies, redesigns, and political battles. What began as a proposal for faster passenger trains has evolved into a crucial component of Europe's climate strategy.

When completed, the journey time between Milan and Paris will be slashed from seven hours to just four, making rail competitive with air travel for the first time on this route. The line is also expected to remove more than one million lorries from Alpine roads annually.From mountain passes to lowland railways

Another primary motivation for the Lyon-Turin project is to transform freight transport across the Alps. Currently, almost 44 million tonnes of goods cross the Western Alps annually, with more than 90% traveling by road.

The world’s longest railway tunnel

The centerpiece of the project is the 57.5-kilometer Mont d'Ambin Base Tunnel —which will surpass Switzerland's 57.1-kilometer Gotthard Base Tunnel to become the world's longest railway tunnel.

The tunnel will connect Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne in France's Maurienne valley with Susa in Italy's Piedmont region. Currently, trains between France and Italy must climb the Mont Cenis mountain on gradients of up to 30% to a height of 1,338 meters, requiring up to three locomotives to haul the trains.

In contrast, the new base tunnel will feature a maximum gradient of just 12.5% and a maximum altitude of 580 meters. This flatter profile will allow heavy freight trains to transit at 100 km/h and passenger trains at 220 km/h, while reducing energy consumption by approximately 40%.

Seven giants boring through a mountain

To build the tunnel, seven giant tunnel boring machines (TBMs) will excavate 85km of the 115km twin-tube length. According to TELT's project director Alexandre Heim, there are 14 different types of ground conditions along the tunnel route, ranging from loose ground at the French side to highly challenging schist and gneiss formations with high overburdens between Modane and the Italian border.

For sections near the French tunnel entrance, where loose ground makes TBMs impractical, engineers are employing the New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM), also known as the Sequential Excavation Method. This technique integrates the surrounding rock or soil formations into an overall ring-like support structure, with the formations themselves becoming part of the supporting structure.

In total, the project will involve excavating an astonishing 162 kilometers of tunnels, including two parallel main tunnels, four shafts, and 204 safety bypasses. So far, approximately 39.5 kilometers of exploratory and service tunnels have been completed.

The €25 billion question

The financing of this megaproject is complex. The total cost of the Lyon-Turin line is estimated at €25 billion, with the international section alone (including the base tunnel) costing €11 billion as of 2024 estimates — up from the original €8 billion estimate in 2016.

Funding is shared between the European Union, which contributes 40% of the tunnel costs, Italy (34.7%), and France (25.26%). The EU has indicated willingness to increase its contribution to 55%, as well as to help fund the French access routes if they go beyond mere adaptations of existing infrastructure.

This massive investment has been subject to intense scrutiny. In 2012, the French Court of Audit questioned the reliability of cost estimates and projected traffic volumes. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has investigated allegations of cost overruns, potential mafia infiltration, and conflicts of interest.

In Italy, the Five Star Movement strongly opposed the project while their coalition partner, the League party, firmly supported it. This internal conflict within the Italian government reached a crisis point in March 2019 when Italy's Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte officially requested TELT to stop the launch of tenders for further construction work.

Despite these challenges, funding has continued to flow. In January 2024, just before an EU deadline, the French national government and various local entities reached a last-minute agreement on their respective contributions to studies for the French section, preventing the loss of additional EU support.

The puzzle of why Lyon may wait until 2045

Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the Lyon-Turin project is the disconnect between completion timelines for different sections. While the Mont d'Ambin base tunnel is scheduled for completion by 2032, the access routes on the French side might not be ready until 2045 — more than a decade later.

This discrepancy stems from the French government appearing more inclined to modernize the historic Dijon-Modane railway line, which doesn't pass through Lyon, rather than building new direct access routes as originally planned.

This means Dijon might get access to the tunnel long before Lyon does, contradicting the original project design and potentially limiting its effectiveness. The railway lines from Lyon to the tunnel might not be complete for another thirteen years after the tunnel opens, creating a bizarre situation where the centerpiece of the project is finished but cannot be fully used.

This week on the podcast

This week on the podcast, our hosts analyze the Toulouse Metro Line C Expansion, a €3.4 billion project using innovative variable density tunnel boring machines to create a 27km line combining underground tunnels and elevated viaduct sections.

They also discuss Autodesk's restructuring, which saw 1,350 employees laid off as the company shifts to a self-serve model, and debate whether construction software provides genuine competitive advantage or simply becomes a necessary tax for staying in business.

Welcome to another issue of The Off Site, brought to you by Aphex.

This week, we're exploring the largest urban transport project in Europe: the Grand Paris Express.

This €42 billion megaproject promises to connect Paris's sprawling suburbs to each other — without requiring passengers to travel through the congested city center.

This promises to transform mobility. But will it transform the city itself?

Let's dive in.

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A new metro for Paris

Visitors to Paris might wonder why it needs a new metro system. The metro system within the municipal borders of Paris is already the second busiest in Europe.

The problem is that the municipal borders of Paris are a mere 100 km2 — compared to 1600 km2 for London. While there are 2 million people living inside these borders, an extra 11 million live in the surrounding metropolitan area.

And for these Parisians, getting around can be a nightmare. Commuting to work in the city can require multiple modes of transportation, with commutes of ninety minutes each way not uncommon.

For those looking to travel to another suburb, the situation is even worse. The current Paris transport network follows a hub-and-spoke model, which forces travelers to go through central Paris even when their destination is a neighbouring suburb.

The scope of the Grand Paris Express

The Grand Paris Express is looking to transform this hub and spoke model by building a series of metro lines connecting the greater Paris region. The goal of the new metro lines is to create a 20 minute city — not just for municipal Paris, but the entirety of ‘Grand Paris.’

When finished, the project will have built 68 new stations and 200 kilometers of additional tracks.

The full network will include:

• Line 14 extension: 14km connecting Orly Airport to Saint-Denis Pleyel (partial sections operational)

• Line 15: A 75km circular line around Paris (South section partially open)

• Line 16: A 29km line serving eastern and northeastern suburbs (under construction)

• Line 17: A 27km line connecting major airports to Saint-Denis (partial opening)

• Line 18: A 35km line linking scientific and educational centers (under construction)

Construction began in 2015, with the full network now expected to be completed between 2030 and 2032. As of early 2025, several key segments are operational, including portions of Line 14 and sections of Line 15 South.

The initial budget of €18.3 billion has now reached approximately €42 billion—more than double the original estimate.

The social drivers of better transportation

Proponents of the project regularly tout increased productivity from reduced commutes. But the other major driver for the project is to connect disadvantaged neighborhoods to the rest of Paris.

Several stations serve historically disadvantaged neighborhoods like Clichy-Montfermeil, areas that have long suffered from poor transport connections.

Studies suggest that this will see the number of jobs accessible within a 45-minute commute from specific stations increase by over 300,000, potentially transforming opportunities for residents.

The shifting size of work packages

The Société du Grand Paris — the contracting authority for the Grand Paris Express — has experimented with package size and scope over the course of the project.

Building up to the project’s peak in 2021 — when work on all four lines, plus 30 stations, was being undertaken at once — the team initially broke work into smaller packages so more contractors could participate.

This was to address a potential worry that the scope of the project would saturate the market.

But as GE Plus reports in a discussion with Société du Grand Paris director Bernard Cathelain, this created a different problem of coordination.

The larger number of station fit out packages increased the number of interfaces between disciplines creating overlaps and congestion on site. This put pressure on costs and schedules.

“The lessons we took from Line 15 South was that there were a lot of interfaces – lots of work which was divided up and which needed coordinating and there were real difficulties when we were doing the work,” Cathelain explains.

Major French construction firms including Vinci, Eiffage, and Bouygues have secured significant portions of the work, often forming consortia to tackle complex sections.

Notable contract awards include:

• A Vinci-led consortium's €1.7 billion contract for the southern section of Line 15

• Eiffage's €1.1 billion contract (with partners) for part of Line 16

• Bouygues leading construction on multiple sections, including parts of Line 14

Tunnels, tunnels, and more tunnels

Nearly all of the Grand Paris Express is tunnels. At its peak, the project had over 20 tunnel boring machines (TBMs) operating simultaneously—a record for a single European project.

These massive machines, each costing approximately €20 million and stretching up to 100 meters, navigate numerous challenges beneath Paris, including complex geology, crossing beneath the Seine and Marne rivers, and navigating around existing infrastructure.

To prevent disruption in densely populated areas, the tunneling teams even froze the soil.

As of 2025, over 75% of the tunneling work is complete, with the remaining sections presenting some of the most challenging geological conditions.

Station architecture

As you would expect in a Parisian project, the 68 new stations aren't merely transport hubs—they're works of art.

The Villejuif-Gustave Roussy station, for example, features a dramatic conical atrium bringing natural light deep underground while creating visual connections between different levels.

The project also pairs each station with an artist to create site-specific works reflecting local heritage.

At Orly Airport station, for example, Alexandre Farto (known as Vhils) has created ‘Strates Urbaines’, a mural of more than 11,000 Portuguese ceramic tiles called azulejos.

On the podcast this week

On the podcast this week, we chat about Norway's audacious E39 Highway project, the recently announced $1 billion partnership between Microsoft and engineering giant WSP, and HiArc's impressive technology that converts simple 2D sketches into fully-formed 3D models with real-time cost estimates.

Welcome to another issue of The Off Site!

If you've ever driven Norway's western coast, you know the routine: drive for a while, wait for a ferry to cross the fjord, drive some more, wait for another ferry.

And so it goes. If you drive the entire 1100 km route, this takes 21 hours.

This week, we look at ambitious and controversial plans to eliminate these ferry connections through what might be some of the most complex infrastructure engineering happening in Europe right now.

Let's dive in.

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A ferry-free future

The E39 highway runs 1,100 kilometers along Norway's western coast from Kristiansand in the south to Trondheim in the north. Currently, the route includes seven ferry crossings, making the journey time approximately 21 hours.

The Norwegian Public Roads Administration's (NPRA) has long-term plans to create an uninterrupted, ferry-free route that will cut travel time to just 11 hours. This includes several ambitious megaprojects to create bridges and tunnels across incredibly deep fjords.

The fate of the entire plan is still up for debate in Norway, as the projects face pressure from groups who say it conflicts with climate goals and that the some of the outcomes could simply be achieved with more frequent ferries.

Critics aside, the vision is an exciting one. The megaproject is potentially a testing ground for new engineering solutions that could change how we cross deep fjords worldwide.

‘Submerged floating tube bridges’

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the proposed E39 project is the proposal to use submerged floating tunnels, or ‘Archimedes bridges’, across several of the most challenging fjords. Though this is an idea researchers have floated (pun intended) for years, if the Norwegians actually build one, it would be the world's first.

The concept is relatively simple: the tunnel would float 20-30 meters below the surface, suspended by pontoons and anchored to the seafloor. This approach solves the challenge of spanning fjords that are too wide for conventional bridges and too deep for traditional tunnels.

The floating tunnels are proposed because the fjords are too deep for subsea tunnels. Sognefjord alone is up to 1200 metres deep. The fjords are also often used by large cruise ships, which can have a height of up to 70 metres.

Excitement around submerged floating tunnels — or “submerged floating tube bridges” as New Civil Engineer calls it — has been high since concept illustrations were released by Norway’s Public Road Administration in 2019. Though with political controversy over the ambition and cost of the plan, it’s still to be seen whether these are ever built.

The world’s longest subsea road tunnel

While the floating tunnels capture the imagination of the public, another megaproject on the route is currently well under construction.

Since 2019, Norway’s Ryfast tunnel has been the world’s longest subsea tunnel — but the E39’s Rogfast tunnel looks set to break the record. When completed in 2033, it will be the world's longest and deepest subsea road tunnel, stretching 27 kilometers and reaching depths of 392 meters below sea level.

The tunnel will run beneath the Boknafjord and Kvitsøyfjord, connecting Randaberg near Stavanger to Bokn, with a 4.1-kilometer spur tunnel extending to Kvitsøy island.

Originally approved by the Norwegian Parliament in 2017 with a budget of NOK 16.8 billion (USD $1.5 billion) and planned for completion in 2025-26, the project faced significant challenges. Construction began in January 2018 but was halted in October 2019 due to cost overruns.

But after a comprehensive review, the project received approval in late 2020 with a revised budget of NOK 24.8 billion (USD $2.2 billion), split between government funding and toll-based loans.

Who’s building the Rogfast tunnel?

Around 70% of the Rogfast project is being built by Implenia Norge and an Implenia Stangeland Maskin joint venture.

This includes the E02 Kvitsøy contract at the southern end of the project, which includes a 8.8km two-way tunnel, with a 10.5m cross-section from Kvitsøy at approximately 230m below sea level.

In 2022, Skanska were also awarded a NOK5bn (£415M) contract to work on the northern part of the tunnel.

Oddvar Kaarmo, the Rogfast project manager, told The Independent that the major challenges to delivery at this point were less technical than logistical.

Once the tunnel is finished, we will not have to rely on good weather to keep the roads open. About half a year after the last drill and blast, we have to deliver the project, so we have to get a lot of work done simultaneously. It’s more about logistics than tunnelling.

The world’s longest floating bridge

Another exciting potential megaproject is the Bjørnafjorden crossing. This is part of the Hordfast project of the E39, and aim aims to replace a slow ferry service across the fjord with a direct road connection between Bergen and Stavanger. The 5-kilometer structure would replace a 40-minute ferry journey with an 11-minute drive, forming a crucial link in the E39 coastal highway between Bergen and Stavanger.

What makes this project unique is its floating pontoon design — a necessary solution as the fjord's 550-meter depth makes traditional foundations impractical. The bridge will consist of 38 steel pontoons, with three anchored to the seabed and the rest floating freely.

Each pontoon is approximately 50 meters long, with a distinctive rectangular shape chosen to minimize fabrication costs while maximizing stability in harsh North Sea conditions.

The engineering challenges are significant: the structure must handle substantial wave loads and wind forces while providing a 150-foot vertical clearance for marine traffic. To achieve its 100-year design life, the bridge will use a combination of passive galvanic cathodic protection and specialized coatings to prevent corrosion.

If successful, this groundbreaking project could apparently set new standards for bridge construction in deep waters worldwide.

But will it happen?

These projects are exciting — but will they happen? Aside from the Rogfast tunnel, work hasn’t been started on the other megaprojects discussed for the E39, and they remain hugely controversial within Norway.

Like all massive transport projects, E39 upgrade projects have been subject to budget blowouts, environmental criticisms, and economic debate.

Recently, the NPRA claimed that the Hordfast crossing would have a net-positive social impact — a relatively rare result for roading projects in Norway. But the roading agency was forced to recalculate because this result ignored the government’s actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in transport, including the fact that “toll fees or other measures must ensure zero growth in car traffic in major cities.”

Critics also argue that the project's massive cost could be better spent on other infrastructure needs or on developing more sustainable transport options. The Norwegian Green Party has called for a scaling back of the project, arguing that improved ferry services could achieve similar benefits at a fraction of the cost — primarily because some of the time wasted by commuters currently is spent at the dock waiting for ferries.

For these reasons, the future of the E39 upgrade remains uncertain.

On the podcast this week

This week on The Off Site pod, Jase and Carlos discuss Canada’s high-speed rail ambitions, practical AI applications in construction, and a recent survey that looks into job satisfaction among construction professionals.

Welcome to another issue of The Off Site, brought to you by Aphex. This week, we look at the only G7 country without high speed rail: Canada.

Like their neighbours to the south, Canada has long flirted with high speed rail. Since 1970, there have been 26 feasibility studies. Projects have been announced — and abandoned.

In October 2024, it seemed like the wait might be over. The federal government announced that their ‘High Frequency Rail’ project between Toronto and Quebec City would be upgraded to high speed rail.

So far, so good. But what does this mean for transport in the region? And what are the likely bumps along the (rail)road?

Let’s dive in.

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Toronto to Montreal in three hours

The proposed project will create a new, largely electrified high speed railway between Toronto and Quebec City.

If the line expands to Windsor in southwest Ontario, the line would serve over half of Canada’s population — including its two biggest cities.

With top speeds of up to 300 km/h, the line will take passengers from Toronto and Montreal in three hours, much faster than car or existing rail routes, and competitive with total trip times by plane.

While nothing official has been released, some reports suggest it might cost between $80 and $120 billion.

What’s wrong with the existing rail service?

The project will replace the existing train service in the corridor operated by VIA Rail, Canada's national passenger railway company.

This service is notoriously slow and unreliable, primarily because the tracks VIA Rail uses are actually owned by freight railways (primarily CN Rail). This means passenger trains yield to the more lucrative freight traffic, causing delays and inconsistent travel times.

Right now, VIA Rail trains operate at speeds of 60 to 120 km/h along most of the route. For passengers, the problem is only getting worse. Passenger trips along the line are one hour slower than they were in the 1970s.

Is Canada too big for high speed rail?

So, there’s a good case for better rail service along the line. But is high speed rail necessary?

One criticism is that Canada’s population is dispersed across an enormous area, making high speed rail impractical. This is contrasted with the compact geography of Europe, which is often seen as the poster child for successful high speed rail projects.

While there’s no disputing the enormous size of Canada, the population density along the proposed route is actually not dissimilar to major European lines.

This excellent infographic from the CBC makes the case that the proposed line would serve a similar population along a similar distance as successful projects in Italy, France, and Spain.

High speed — or high frequency?

The original proposal for the line from VIA Rail was for a high frequency rail service.

The ‘high frequency’ proposal aimed to build new purpose-built tracks that the existing trains could use, without competing with freight. This would allow them to offer a faster, more reliable, and more frequent service, without the likely cost blowouts of a high speed rail line.

In October 2024, this proposal was changed to full high speed rail — apparently as a result of discussions with consortia bidding for the project.

However, as of writing, the official website for the line is still ‘HFR’ — high frequency rail — and much of the official communication hasn’t caught up with the new high-speed approach.

Who’s building it?

Three consortia were invited to bid on the project in 2021:

• Cadence (CDPQ Infra, SNC-Lavalin, Systra Canada, Keolis Canada)

• Intercity Rail Developers (Intercity Development Partners, EllisDon Capital, Kilmer Transportation, First Rail Holdings, Jacobs, Hatch, CIMA+, First Group, RATP Dev Canada, Renfe Operadora)

• QConnexiON Rail Partners (Fengate, John Laing, Bechtel, WSP Canada, Deutsche Bahn)

The winner is expected to be announced soon.

According to reports, the work of the consortia to date is the primary reason why the project has evolved into a high speed service.

As the CBC reports:

According to a government source, the consortia's work demonstrated that the high-speed rail option was ‘much less expensive than originally anticipated.’

The economics of high speed rail

With the cost blowouts in projects like California High Speed Rail and HS2 in the UK, it’s easy to be skeptical of consortia talking down the costs of high speed rail.

While the cost of the line will be high — potentially north of $100 billion — the benefits are clear. The CBC spoke with John Gradek, a faculty lecturer at McGill University, who calls the project a no-brainer.

Gradek suggests that the money will be spent on transport infrastructure, one way or another. With over 150 daily flights between Montreal and Toronto, more road and airport infrastructure is sure to be required if high speed rail isn’t delivered

According to transport commentator Reece Martin in The Hub, the cost would be much more manageable if the project was limited to Toronto and Montreal. As we saw with California High Speed Rail, cost blowouts on megaprojects can be caused as much by political decisions as technical challenges.

Will it actually get built?

The design process for the high speed rail process is likely to last 5 years. If the Liberals fall from power in the next election, there’s every chance the project could be cancelled.

This is exactly what happened to a high speed rail project in Ontario announced by the Liberal government in 2017, only to be abandoned in 2022 when Conservatives led by Doug Ford came to power.

Critics also point to the slew of major transport projects in Canada running over budget and behind schedule, from the Réseau Express Métropolitain, scheduled to open 7 years later than planned, to the Ontario Line, which has escalated in costs from $10.9 billion to $27.2 billion.

That said, the Policy Declaration of the Conservative Party of Canada says:

We support rail infrastructure across Canada, including innovative high-speed passenger rail where warranted.

For proponents, there is enough to be cautiously optimistic that the project will proceed in some form, regardless of who is in power.

What we’re reading this week

• New Civil Engineer covers the award of the $1.18bn contract for the Manhattan Tunnel Project to a Frontier-Kemper and Tutor Perini joint venture. This is part of the $16bn Hudson Tunnel Project.

• From Roads Online, STRABAG completed their acquisition of Australian building and civil construction company Georgiou Group after the deal was approved by Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board.

• Construction Briefing outlines three ways President Trump’s recent flurry of executive orders could impact construction.

Welcome to the first Off Site of the new year!

This week, we’re covering the most contentious infrastructure project in the United States: California High Speed Rail.

Elon Musk hates it. Supporters hate how it’s been handled. It needs up to $85 billion in additional funding.

But the project is underway, and it ultimately promises to connect tens of millions of people across Los Angeles, San Francisco, and the Central Valley.

Let’s dive in.

About California High Speed Rail

California High Speed Rail is a high-speed rail project with the initial aim of connecting Los Angeles and San Francisco. When finished, the line will be 800 miles long, with trains going over 200 miles per hour.

This has been a long-held dream by Californian politicians, first proposed by Governor Jerry Brown in 1979.

The current project launched in 2008, following a ballot measure championed by the Governator, Arnold Schwarzenegger. This plan was intended to have the full service from San Francisco to Los Angeles finished by 2020.

This… didn’t happen. As of writing, the only section currently under construction is the Central Valley, connecting smaller cities like Fresno and Bakersfield. There are no funded plans to connect this section with the metropolitan areas of San Francisco or Los Angeles.

The map below gives a sense of the project’s scope, with the blue line showing work that is yet to be started (or funded). The green line shows a proposed Phase 2, extending the line north to Sacramento and south to San Diego.

To complete the full Los Angeles to San Francisco line, the project will need an additional $85 billion.

How (not) to pick a route

How did things go wrong?

A detailed piece in the New York Times points to political interference. Rather than choose the most direct route from Los Angeles to San Francisco along the existing Interstate 5 corridor, the project made a series of political compromises.

As the Times writes:

The train’s path out of Los Angeles was diverted across a second mountain range to the rapidly growing suburbs of the Mojave Desert — a route whose most salient advantage appeared to be that it ran through the district of a powerful Los Angeles county supervisor.

These compromises added billions to the project cost of the railway — and added much more complexity around land acquisition and environmental approvals.

According to the Times, this led French national railway SNCF to leave the project in 2011 to work somewhere less politically dysfunctional: North Africa.

In the most devastating line of the article, the Times notes that Morocco’s “bullet train service launched in 2018.”

What’s actually being built

Dysfunction aside, a section of the line is currently under construction.

Known as the Initial Operating Segment, this section stretches 171 miles through the Central Valley of California. The work is divided into four construction packages.

The design and build of CP 1 is led by a Tutor-Perini, Zachry, and Parsons joint venture. The contract is currently valued at $3.6 billion. The project broke ground in 2013 and the expected completion date is 2026.

CP 1 runs 32 miles from Madera through the city of Fresno and includes twelve grade separations, two viaducts, one tunnel, and a crossing at the San Joaquin river.

The design and build of CP 2-3 is led by a Dragados and Flatiron joint venture. The contract is currently valued at over $3.4 billion. The project broke ground in 2015 and the expected completion date is 2026.

CP 2-3 runs 65 miles and includes 36 grade separations, including viaducts, underpasses and overpasses.

The design and build of CP 4 is led by a Ferrovial-Agroman and Griffith joint venture. The contract is currently valued at over $750 million. The project broke ground in 2016 and was declared complete this month.

CP 4 runs 22 miles and includes a range of overcrossings, viaducts and the relocation of existing tracks.

How has the scope of work changed?

The Fresno Bee points out that every work package has faced significant changes, with hundreds of change orders approved over the course of the contract.

Because these change orders are publicly available, we thought we’d run some analysis to see any patterns.

There have been over 1500 change orders across the three packages to date.

For CP 1, there have been 651 change orders totalling $2.75B. Forty of these change orders have been over $10 million. The biggest single change order is $198.5 million for additional intrusion barriers.

26.1% of change orders on CP 1 are for ‘Changes to Plans and Specifications’ with 12.1% for ‘Utility Relocation.’

For CP 2-3, there have been 578 change orders totalling $2.23B. Thirty-nine of these change orders have been over $10 million. The biggest single change order is $242.1 million for the Hanford Viaduct superstructure (the largest high-speed rail structure in the Central Valley).

38.2% of change orders on CP 2-3 are for 'Changes to Plans and Specifications' with 14.0% for 'Administrative' matters.

For CP 4, there have been 288 change orders totalling $398M. Eleven of these change orders have been over $10 million. The biggest single change order is $40.5 million for a dispute resolution settlement.

25.3% of change orders on CP 4 are for 'Third-Party Related' issues with 19.8% for 'Environmental' matters.

Engineering challenges

If the full project is ever funded, it will face major engineering challenges connecting to either San Francisco or Los Angeles.

In the north, the project will need to tunnel through the Diablo Range at Pacheco Pass. At completion, this tunnel would be 13 miles long — the largest in the US.

According to Engineering News Record, “the project faces significant challenges in this area due to poor-quality rock formations, faults and shear zones, and potentially high groundwater inflows that can affect tunnel stability.”

The situation isn’t any easier in the south, with 36 miles of tunnels proposed, including 28 through the San Gabriel mountain ranges into the Los Angeles basin.

Tunnel boring machines have been identified as the best method for both proposed projects.

Will it ever finish?

Well-sourced commentators like Ezra Klein argue that the project will not be finished in its current form. There simply isn’t the money available, especially federally following the reelection of Donald Trump.

The original justification for the project — to reduce reliance on car and air travel in the most populous regions of the state — remains persuasive. But critics continue to argue that the opportunity cost is too great and the timeline too distant to make a meaningful impact on climate change.

That said, at the time of writing, Governor Newsom of California is still bullish on the long term prospects of the plan, recently announcing a $310 billion plan for rail across California. As some have pointed out, the project may have become too big to fail.

What we’re reading

• Highly recommend reading the full breakdown of the CaHSR from the New York Times.

• A brilliant deep drive from New Civil Engineer into the erosion of a seaside village in Norfolk, with some startling aerial photographs.

• As always, Last Week in Contech is a great read.

• Rail Baltica is an 870km high-speed railway that connects the Baltic states to Poland and the rest of Europe.

• The Russian invasion of Ukraine has made the project strategically important to European defense, supporting potential Nato troop movements.

• Rail Baltica comes in at USD $17 million per km — dwarfed by the $35 million per km for the Las Vegas High-Speed Rail, $127 million per km for the California High-Speed Rail, and an eye-watering $300 million per km for the HS2 in the UK.

A geopolitical railway

Rail Baltica is a high-speed rail project that will connect Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with Poland and the wider European rail network.

The railway will stretch 870km, with a design speed of 240 km/h, making some journeys competitive with airplane travel. It will also be interoperable with the existing European network, unlike the current Baltic railway network, which uses Russian-grade tracks.

But like all megaprojects, development hasn’t been smooth. The scope of the project has been pulled back as costs have ballooned, and the delivery date has been pushed four years to 2030.

Critics argue that the project has crowded out other critical infrastructure projects in the region, while proponents point out that the invasion of Ukraine makes the network critical for potential movements of Nato troops should Russia invade.

The history of Rail Baltica

The railway lines in the Baltics were initially constructed by the Russians in the nineteenth century in Russian gauge of 1520 mm, wider than the 1435 mm gauge used by the Europeans.

Apparently, this was intended to make European invasion more difficult (it didn’t work). But for the Baltics states today, Russian gauge railways make freight and passenger transportation slower and more cumbersome, with trains needing to offload in Poland.

Folks have been pitching the concept of Rail Baltica since the early nineties, though given the small population of the Baltic states — totaling little more than 6 million people — it hasn’t always been considered economically viable.

Enter the Trans European Transport Network (TEN-T). The TEN-T aims to build transport infrastructure across all of Europe, with all major nodes connected by 2030, and the project as a whole will be completed by 2040. €500 billion has been suggested for the entire network, which includes 65,000 km of railway (not just high speed), 136,000 km of roads, and 23,000 km inland waterways.

Spiraling costs

The TEN-T unlocked the funds required for Rail Baltica, with the EU budgeting to provide 85% of the costs — on an initial project estimate of €5.8 billion in 2017 (up from the original €3.5 billion estimate in 2010).

But as with every major high-speed rail project, costs have not stayed within this initial scope. The most recent estimate is that the project will cost over €24 billion — an escalation threatening to put the entire project at risk.

As a result, the scope of the project has been scaled back. Fewer stations are planned, and most of the project is single-tracked. The project has also been pushed back to 2030, four years after its original planned completion date.

There is real concern that the small Baltic states will face difficulties funding even their relatively small share of the mega-project. National auditors for the Baltic states warn that delays and funding shortfalls may push the project out past 2030 — even though further delays will make the project even more expensive.

Military mobility

While criticism of the projects has become louder, the railway has become strategically even more important following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Estonia and Latvia share a border with Russia, while Lithuania is next to Russian enclave Kaliningrad. Lithuania’s recent move to fortify the bridge to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad shows how immediate these concerns are in the region.

As the BBC reports, there are currently 10,000 Nato troops in the region, which could jump to 200,000 in the event of an invasion. Rail Baltica is a key point of connection with Europe, and on completion, will make it possible for troops to travel directly from the Netherlands to Tallinn.

How does it compare with other high-speed projects?

Geopolitics aside, the cost of high-speed rail projects like these is eye-watering. How does Rail Baltica compare to other high-speed rail projects around the world?

While there are obvious variables, including the cost of building through major metro areas, we thought we’d do some back-of-the-napkin comparisons.

• With Rail Baltica’s new budget of €24 billion, it comes in at USD $17 million per km.

• The Brightline West high-speed rail project in Las Vegas costs $35 million per km.

• The California High-Speed Rail project costs $127 million per km.

• However, all of these are dwarfed by HS2 in the UK, which costs $300 million per km.

What else is interesting about Rail Baltica?

A project this size has no end of interesting stories. But to save me writing another few thousand words, I thought I’d share a few highlights:

• The 1500-metre bridge across the Neris River in Lithuania will be 40 metres high with 376 piles, requiring 7.6 thousand cubic meters of concrete.

• Rail Baltica runs through areas used by the USSR — and later Latvian — military, which still have unexploded ordnances from World War II.

• The project recently shortlisted five consortia for the Lithuania section of the project, valued at up to 932 million euros.

• According to the Delivery Manager for Rail Baltica in Lithuania, “the project document for the first ten kilometers is over 20,000 pages long.”

• To avoid habitat fragmentation through the ‘barrier effect’, the project creates ecoducts to allow animals to cross the railway.

On the podcast

On a recent podcast, we discussed the rising wave of investment in planning tools, American contractor Tutor Perini's strategic shift to limit project bids to $500 million, and the unique Antwerp Port House, detailing the challenges of building a new structure over a heritage-protected building.

What we’re reading this week

• The Impossible Build has an entertaining short video on the Rail Baltica project.

• This isn’t exactly reading, but I enjoyed the BBC’s Business Daily podcast on Rail Baltica.

• Following Jason’s newsletter last week on consolidation in the construction industry, Australian contractor Georgiou Group is in the latter stages of being acquired by STRABAG for an undisclosed sum.

1. The construction industry is continuing the long march to consolidation, with M&A deal value tripling in the year to July 2024.

2. There are clear reasons for these deals, but there are also risks and downsides.

3. Of the hundreds of M&A deals globally, we pick 6 of the most interesting.

As always, skip to the end for a roundup of what we’re reading this week.

The industry is consolidating

On a recent episode of the Off Site Podcast, we talked about the acquisition of British contractor FM Conway by Vinci. The deal raised all sorts of questions — including the growing dominance of foreign firms in UK construction — but it’s far from unique.

In fact, we’re in the midst of a wave of consolidation in the industry. According to Deloitte, there were 528 merger and acquisition deals in the engineering and construction industry in the 12 months to July 2024

The combined value of these deals was US$38 billion, which Deloitte notes “is more than three times the deal value from the previous year.”

With interest rates declining, Deloitte sees this trend continuing into 2025. But what are the other drivers of consolidation?

The drivers of consolidation

The first reason we’re seeing consolidation is that major public works projects are getting bigger and more complex. These require firms with the skills, labour, and balance sheet to take on the risk.

The second is that consolidation is a path to growth. In a drive for efficiency and competitive advantage, firms will always look to expand their footprint through acquisition.

This isn’t unique to construction. Nearly every industry has been going through waves of consolidation — from supermarkets to doctors’ offices — and construction is no different.

The incentives for further M&A activity seem clear. If I had to make a prediction, I’d say we can expect more of the same in the year ahead.

The problems with consolidation

So, there are good reasons for consolidation in the industry. But what are the downsides?

1. Risk of systemic failure

As projects increase in size and importance, the contractors building them can become too big to fail. With the consolidation of expertise and capacity, strategically important public works projects can risk major delays if contractors go out of business.

Case in point: the long fallout of the failure of Carillion on the UK industry (more on that below).

2. Lower competition

Greater consolidation inevitably leads to less competition, and this can drive up costs. According to research, consolidation in the construction industry is partially pushing up the cost of road building projects by hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

3. Foreign ownership of a strategically important sector

In smaller countries like Australia — and even the UK — foreign ownership of strategically important sectors like construction can be a cause for concern.

6 notable deals from 2024

ACS Group purchases Dornan

• In September, ACS group announced the purchase of Dornan, a specialist in the advanced technology sector.

• ACS says that this will support its strategic growth in Europe, identifying over $20 billion in advanced technology project opportunities.

ACCIONA acquires Freya Renewables

• In May, ACCIONA Energía acquired an 80 percent stake in Freya Renewables, a consultancy firm for renewable development based in the Phillippines.

• This brings an additional 880MW under development for ACCIONA Energía.

ACS combines Dragados and Flatiron Construction

• While not technically an acquisition, the integration in July of ACS Group’s civil engineering and construction businesses Dragados and Flatiron Construction is still a major deal.

• Combined, they become the second-largest civil engineering firm in the U.S.

Stantec acquires Hydrock

• On May 1, Stantec annouced the acquisition of Hydrock, an 950 person engineering design firm headquartered in Bristol, England.

• This increased the Stantec workforce in the UK by 30 percent, with Hydrok generating turnover of £74 million in 2023.

Eiffage buys German infrastructure company Eqos

• In April, French company Eiffage Énergie Systèmes purchased EQOS Group, a German company that specialises in technical infrastructure for energy, communications, and railway.

• In 2023, Eqos had revenues of €459m and 1,700 staff.

• Its purchase supports Eiffage’s moves into the German market, which is currently investing heavily in energy generation ands transmission.

Vinci’s purchase of FM Conway

• On October 30, Vinci announced the purchase of FM Conway for an undisclosed sum.

• FM Conway is a UK infrastructure family that specialises in transportation networks and the built environment, with revenues of £580 million to March 2024.

• FM Conway is itself no stranger to acquisitions, purchasing Toppesfield in 2021 and Flowline in 2023.

The cautionary tale of Carillion

It’s common to see acquisitions as a way to reduce risk. But when these acquisitions increase debt to unsustainable levels and dilute the focus of the core business, then it doesn’t take much for the house of cards to collapse.

The most dramatic example of this is Carillion, which collapsed in 2018 following a period of aggressive expansion with many large acquisitions, particularly focused on services firms.

The BBC has a good, short overview. And whoever wrote this Wikipedia article deserves a medal.

The latest from the Off Site Podcast

This week, we discuss:

• The construction of the world’s largest telescope in Chile.

• Construction tech tools to watch in the future.

• Webuild and Bouygues being awarded work on the Suburban Rail Loop and the impact of international contractors operating in Australia.

What we’re reading this week

• This Science Friday article shows the construction of the appropriately named Extremely Large Telescope in Chile.

• Brian Potter from the Construction Physics Substack dives into the (patchy) data to answer the question, How good are American roads?

• China has started construction on the first offshore Gigawatt-sized solar power project.

1. Managers want bad news as early as possible. Delayed bad news leads to delayed projects.

2. Production rates can help quantify actual progress, but they’re not magic and have real limitations

3. With multidisciplinary projects, production rates can be used tactically, but nothing beats proper communication.

Skip to the end for links to what we’re reading this week.

A common story

Stop me if you’ve heard this one before.

A junior engineer — let’s call him ‘Jase’ — has a sense that a task isn’t going to finish on time, but delays communicating this to his manager. Because who knows? Maybe the team on site will find a way to accelerate progress next week. 

The problem is, the team doesn’t find a way to accelerate the task. Work gets further and further behind. But he keeps it to himself he knows it's his job to solve problems and hold the schedule.

It’s only when 80% of the time has passed with only 50% of the work completed that Jase knows he’s going to have to bite the bullet. He needs to tell his manager the truth.

The problem is, his boss has been reporting to her bosses that there are no delays, so she’s understandably a little angry. Jase decides to sugarcoat the bad news and says that he’s only a week behind. 

Spoiler alert: he’s at least three weeks behind. This scene is going to repeat itself at least two more times before he learns the golden rule: never wait to give bad news on a construction project.

Managers want bad news

This is a rule that everyone working on major projects learns in their careers. If you’re lucky, you only have to learn it once.

There are always issues on major projects, and the time-estimates for tasks are rarely perfectly accurate. If there’s data coming from site that work is going to take longer, it’s in everyone’s interest to share that information as soon as possible.

Who knows? There might be a way to speed up the task, or divert resources to get it over the line in time. 

Worse case scenario, there isn’t a solution, and the task is delayed. But at least your manager isn’t misleading the executive team about the project (and the exec isn’t, in turn, misleading the client). 

Managers should make it clear they want bad news

The problem for young Jase is that managers don’t always make it clear what the stakes are. 

It’s great for engineers to own their own tasks and be responsible for delivery, but this can’t come at the cost of clear communication. 

At the end of the day, it’s the manager's job to build this culture. This might sound a bit wooly for more hard-headed folks in the industry, but it can be the difference between delivery on time and majorly expensive blow-outs.

Production rates can help

The story above is a people problem, first and foremost. But wherever possible, engineers will always look to sidestep people-problems with quantitative data. 

In a perfect world, it shouldn’t matter whether Jase has the courage to report delays to his manager. The data should make it clear early in the piece that the predicted time frame isn’t going to be met. 

Enter production rates. As we all know, these are metrics used in construction to measure the progress of predictable and repeatable tasks. If you’re digging a tunnel for example, a production rate will give you a sense of how much tunnel has been dug, and how this tracks against the original plan.

Jase may or may not still get in trouble, but his boss will have an accurate view of the job either way.

So far, so good.

Production rates don’t always work

On major projects with a lot of disciplines working together, production rates are more complicated to implement. This is because the work changes qualitatively from week to week, and there’s no single metric that can give an accurate measure of the project.

In this instance, many projects default to re-planning week to week. This is a messy process that requires a lot of information gathering. And a lot of meetings. With tools like Aphex, some of this gets a lot easier, but you’re still not going to get the magic number that an engineer-brain likes to see. 

Still, there will always be aspects of a job that can be measured using production rates. Some data is always better than no data, and anything that can give the team a better sense of how the project is progressing is ultimately a good thing.

Always be communicating

For me, there’s no getting around the basic need to communicate with each other on site. The best tools and processes work because they make this easier to do. 

Engineers can dream of tracking and metrics that remove this need to surface qualitative information from humans.

But ultimately, there’s no getting around the fact that humans have the best insight into what’s going on at any time. Delivery teams need to talk to each other in a structured way to surface issues early.

Let’s hope this ‘Jase’ (totally not me) has learned his lesson.

On the podcast

We talk about this topic more on a recent episode of The Off Site podcast. You can listen to the full discussion on Apple, Spotify, or watch on Youtube 👇

What we’re reading this week

• Amar Hanspal worked at Autodesk for 27 years, including a stint as CEO. The Bricks and Bytes team have his 12 lessons for developing products, including to play the long game and expect the punch.

• Another week, another great edition of Last Week in Contech.

• An ITV documentary revealed 21,000 confirmed worker fatalities resulting from work on Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. Tom Pashby at New Civil Engineer looks into the silence surrounding the projects.